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REMOTE TESTIMONY-A PROSECUTOR'S PERSPECTIVE
Lynn Helland*
Although the Supreme Court has declined,' for now, to endorse
the Judicial Conference proposal to add a Rule 26(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit live video testimony
under limited circumstances, I agree with Professor Friedman 2 that
the matter is far from over. This is both because the potential
benefits to be realized from the use of remote video testimony are
too large to ignore and because, on closer inspection, any Con-
frontation Clause concerns that might underlie the Court's
hesitation to adopt the proposal are not warranted. My purpose in
writing is to summarize some of the benefits of remote video testi-
mony, to address the constitutionality of the proposal (including
the issues that apparently caused a majority of the Court and cause
Professor Friedman to hesitate before endorsing it), to discuss
some particulars of the Judicial Conference proposal and Professor
Friedman's suggested alternative, and to take a quick look at po-
tential future use of live two-way video testimony.
I. THE BENEFITS
The proposed amendment to Rule 26 would have authorized
the use of remote video testimony in exceptional circumstances
4
when a witness cannot be brought to court to testify in person.
* B.S. 1976, University of Michigan; J.D., 1980, University of Michigan Law School.
Lynn Helland has been an assistant in the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern
District of Michigan for twenty years. Since 1989 he has supervised that office's Special
Prosecutions Unit, which handles a variety of white collar prosecutions including official
corruption and complex fraud. The opinions expressed in this comment are his own, and
not necessarily those of the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan or the United States Department ofJustice.
1. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (April 29, 2002) 1
(statement of ScaliaJ.) [hereinafter, Statement ofJustice Scalia].
2. Many thanks to Professor Friedman for suggesting that the Journal of Law Reform
include a prosecutor's perspective on the proposed amendment to Rule 26, and to Professor
Friedman and the Journal both for giving me the chance to participate.
3. Richard D. Friedman, Remote Testimony, 35 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 2 (2002).
4. The proposal provided:
In the interest of justice, the court may authorize contemporaneous, two-way video
presentation in open court of testimony from a witness who is at a different location if:
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The first question is whether the proposed change is worth the
bother.
I believe it is. The existing Rule 26 gives us the American norm
for testimony in federal criminal trials-witnesses testify in court in
front of judge, jury, defendant, attorneys and spectators, unless ex-
cused from personal appearance by some other federal law. The
existing rule is based on the Sixth Amendment, which expresses a
constitutional "preference" that witnesses in criminal cases testify
live and in-person.
The norm is not an absolute, though. Broadly speaking, there
are two situations in which other federal laws excuse the witness's
personal appearance. One is governed by Rule 15, Fed. R. Crim. P.,
which permits a witness's deposition to be substituted for live tes-
timony when "exceptional circumstances" make it in the interests
of justice to do so. Admissible hearsay and its close cousins, taken
as a class, create the other exception to mandatory personal ap-
pearance by a "witness."6 Because I cannot imagine a plausible way
in which two-way video testimony would bear on any of the usual
hearsay situations, the hearsay exception to in-court testimony will
not be further discussed in this section.
As just noted, Rule 15 only authorizes the taking of depositions
under "exceptional circumstances." The deposition is only admis-
the requesting party establishes exceptional circumstances for such transmission;
appropriate safeguards for the transmission are used; and
the witness is unavailable within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4)-
(5).
Proposed FED. R. CRIM. P. 26(b).
5. See, for example, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980), and Calfornia v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 157 (1970), both of which acknowledged that "preference" before holding that
testimony of a witness from an earlier proceeding is admissible even if the witness is no
longer available to testify in person at trial.
6. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 804 admits certain types of "testimony," e.g.
out of court statements against the witness's interest, if the witness is unavailable for one of
several reasons, e.g. death or poor memory. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 admits several
other types of "testimony," e.g. out of court excited utterances, whether or not the witness is
available to testify in person. In addition, Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (2) (E) character-
izes as non-hearsay the out of court statements of co-conspirators made in furtherance of a
conspiracy.
7. Technically speaking, Rule 15 depositions are themselves a part of the hearsay
class. While it is Rule 15 that authorizes taking a deposition in a criminal case, the deposi-
tion is admitted, if at all, under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (1). But, unlike other forms
of hearsay, depositions are created for the purpose of taking the place of trial testimony,
subject to their own rules, and are therefore distinct for purposes of this analysis.
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sible if the witness is then unavailable at trial." Compare Rule
26(b), which would have authorized the use of remote video testi-
mony if three conditions were met: The circumstances were
exceptional, the witness was unavailable, and appropriate safe-
guards were in place to guarantee adequate transmission.9 It is
readily apparent that remote video testimony would be authorized
under Rule 26(b) in about, if not exactly, the same circumstances
in which Rule 15 already authorizes the substitution of a deposition
for a live witness. Indeed, that was the apparent goal of the Judicial
Conference.'°
The Advisory Committee believed that two-way video testimony
is, in most respects, superior to other ways of presenting the testi-
mony of unavailable witnesses, so would be an improvement on
Rule 15 in many instances." The Committee was clearly correct. A
deposition is either a stenographic or videographic record of the
testimony of the unavailable witness. If it is stenographic, then
when it is introduced into evidence it is simply read to the jury.
The usual method is to have the attorney for the examining party
read the questions that were asked during the deposition while
someone standing in for the witness, often a support staff em-
ployee of one of the parties, reads the witness's answers verbatim.
The jury has no opportunity to assess the witness's demeanor. Fur-
ther, the proceeding is devoid of spontaneity-in fact, if the person
who plays the part of the witness makes any effort to vary her tone
of voice to reflect emotion, the trial judge will sustain an objection
that the reader is improperly interpreting what the witness actually
said, rather than simply reading it.
The situation is better with video depositions. There, at least, the
witness's own inflection is allowed to come through and the jury
has a chance to observe his demeanor. However, like a steno-
graphic deposition, a videotaped deposition is likely taken weeks,
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e).
9. Professor Friedman suggests that the question whether a pretrial deposition
should be taken under Rule 15 is considerably different from the question whether a witness
should be able to testify from a remote location, so there is no reason for both rules to be
triggered by "exceptional circumstances." Friedman, supra note 4, at 14 n.27. Although
there are certainly some differences between the two rules, both create departures from the
preferred procedure of in-court testimony in order to make available to the jury the testi-
mony of an otherwise unavailable witness. It is not at all clear that there is any significant
difference between the rules in this most important regard, and accordingly, it is not at all
clear why the two should be triggered by different standards.
10. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (April 29, 2002) 8
(Appendix to Statement of Breyer, J.) [hereinafter Appendix].
11. Id.
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months, or sometimes years before the trial.12 Often that is because
the circumstances that make the witness unavailable at trial also
dictate that the testimony be obtained well in advance of the trial.
But even if the witness is available at the time, if not the place, of
trial, few courts are willing to interrupt the flow of the trial to take
a deposition. The only solution is to take the deposition before
trial.
So Professor Friedman is quite correct that even a video deposi-
tion denies the parties the opportunity to question the witness in
the context of other witnesses and trial proceedings.1 3 An attorney
who does not mold his examination of witnesses in light of trial
developments is less than effective, but with most depositions that
opportunity to adapt simply does not exist. Remote two-way video
of the sort proposed by the Advisory Committee would eliminate
all of these drawbacks to the current Rule 15.
Live two-way video offers significant advantages in another cir-
cumstance as well. In the normal case the defendant would be
present at a pretrial deposition. However, in rare cases she might
not.14 For example, it may not be possible for her to be present for
depositions that take place in other countries, if she is in custody
and the foreign government is unwilling to assume responsibility
for her. 5 When this situation has arisen the defendant has typically
participated by open telephone line-in all other respects the end
product is the same as for any other Rule 15 deposition. Rule
26(b) would permit the use of two-way video instead of the tele-
phone in these cases, an obvious improvement.
An example of how this might play out is United States v. Gi-
gante.I1 In Gigante an important witness was unable to be present in
court due to physical disability. The defendant was also infirm,
12. For example, I am currently involved in a case which is scheduled to go to trial in
the latter part of this year, and in which the first trial depositions were taken more than two
years ago.
13. Friedman, supra note 3, at 5.
14. Rule 15 specifies that the defendant must be given the opportunity to be present
during a deposition, and Professor Friedman suggests that if she is not afforded that oppor-
tunity, even if it is impossible to do so, the result appears to violate Rule 15. Friedman, supra
note 3, at 8 n.15. However, Rule 15 appears not to have contemplated the possibility that it
might prove impossible in particular cases to both obtain the testimony and permit the de-
fendant to be present. In situations such as this, that are outside the scope of existing rules,
courts retain the power to fashion orders that are necessary and appropriate to the admini-
stration ofjustice. FED. R. CRIM. P. 2, 57(b); United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir.
1999).
15. See cases cited in note 42, infra.
16. Gigante, 166 E3d 75.
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though, so he could not be brought to the witness. 17 The Gigante
trial court could presumably have permitted the government to
take the witness's deposition. 8 The defendant could have partici-
pated by speakerphone and the jury would have either viewed a
video of the deposition or would have had the deposition tran-
script read to it.
Rather than follow this course the Gigante trial court anticipated
Rule 26(b) and opted to have the witness testify live via two-way
video. The procedure the Gigante court adopted much more nearly
approximated a normal trial than would a Rule 15 deposition. It
was live, the defendant and jury could see the witness, and the wit-
ness could see the defendant and the jury while he testified.
If Rule 26(b) were useful only to improve on existing deposition
practice in the situations just described it would be a worthwhile
improvement. My guess, though, is that the greatest benefits of live
video testimony in federal criminal cases will be realized in a cir-
cumstance that until recently has been relatively uncommon-the
foreign witness. To fully appreciate why it is necessary to start with
an overused word-globalization.
While "globalization" is frequently bandied about it is far from
well understood, and it is beyond my ambition or ability to advance
the broad understanding much. What is clear, even to me, is that
"globalization" has significant implications for the practice of fed-
eral criminal law. The reasons are straightforward. As it has
become easier to travel and communicate between countries it has
become correspondingly easier to engage in international com-
merce of all types. This is largely a great economic benefit.
Unfortunately but inevitably, the same forces that make the benefit
possible have made it correspondingly easier to engage in that sub-
set of international commerce that facilitates or is based on fraud
and other crimes. Equally unfortunate, the ability of nations to
work together to prevent or prosecute international crime has
lagged far behind the ability of the criminally inclined to exploit
their new economic opportunities.'9
17. Id. at 81.
18. See cases cited at note 42, infra.
19. The ability of one country to obtain evidence from another depends on the par-
ticulars of whatever treaty or other agreement is in effect between them. Generally, a
prosecutor in one makes application to the government of the other to procure the desired
evidence. The process typically takes months, even for routine requests, and sometimes
years, even when dealing with a close ally such as Canada. By contrast, with the increased
ease of commerce brought by a world economy striving to reduce international barriers, an
entrepreneurial criminal intent on fraud can freely travel among a variety of countries, rap-
idly establishing bank accounts or nominee companies and engaging necessary services in
SUMMER 2002]
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As a result, it is becoming increasingly likely that in order to
prove to a jury that a federal criminal defendant has committed
fraud, the prosecutor will need evidence from any of a number of
countries in which the defendant may have obtained services that
furthered the fraud. Unless the defendant was thoughtful enough
to use the services only of United States citizens in those foreign
countries, the prosecutor will be unable to subpoena any of those
witnesses to testify at trial.20 That's not necessarily the end of the
day, because there may be a treaty or other agreement between the
United States and the foreign country which enables the prosecu-
tor to use the power of that government to compel those present
in that country to give evidence. But the important point for pre-
sent purposes is not that the evidence is impossible to get. It is that
whatever process does exist will not suffice to bring the live witness
before the jury. It will only permit the United States to avail itself of
the normal mechanism used in that other country to obtain evi-
dence.
If that other country's legal system is based on the common law,
the "normal mechanism" will likely satisfy our Confrontation
Clause as it will probably contemplate the presence of defendant
and defense attorney, the use of direct and cross examination by
the parties, and stenographic recording of the proceedings. But,
the testimony will be obtained in the form of a Rule 15 deposition,
with all the corresponding infirmities discussed above. If, however,
the foreign witness is in a country such as France, Switzerland, or
any of numerous others with legal traditions different than our
own, none of these givens of American criminal jurisprudence may
be available.2' As Professor Friedman's comments about United
States v. Salim demonstrate, the evidence that is available under the
particular local procedure may or may not satisfy the Confronta-
each, and thereby stay well ahead of government efforts to halt the fraud or bring her to
justice.
20. United States citizens are subject to the subpoena power of the court no matter
where in the world they happen to be. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a). On the other hand, citizens of
foreign countries may not be compelled to testify in United States courts unless they can be
served with a subpoena while on United States soil. United States v. Johnpoll, 739 F.2d 702,
709 (2d Cir. 1984).
21. In France, for instance, the questioning is normally by the court, not by the parties.
Defendant and defense attorney are not normally permitted to be present. The proceedings
are recorded in a proces verbal, a form of official (but not verbatim) summary of the witness's
responses. United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d at 947-48. However, in December 2001 the
United States entered into a new Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with France that should
make it easier to use procedures with which we are more familiar.
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tion Clause when offered in a criminal trial in this country. Even
if the evidence is admitted, it will still be a pale version of what one
could present through live two-way video testimony.
To be sure, under present international law the prosecutor
could not usually force a foreign witness to submit to video testi-
mony any more than he could force the witness to come to the
United States to testify in person. But I've now had the opportunity
to interact with a substantial number of foreign witnesses, and my
experience suggests strongly that while many citizens of other
countries adamantly refuse to travel to the United States to testify,
they are willing to accommodate less burdensome requests-a will-
ingness to testify via video from their home country would fit
within the comfort zone of many.
The upshot is that because of the increasingly global nature of
the economy we are likely to see a significant increase in the need
for foreign witnesses in federal criminal trials in the years to come.
However, we are not likely to see much change in our ability to
produce those witnesses in court any time in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Live video testimony therefore offers the opportunity to
obtain foreign evidence in a form that much more nearly satisfies
the Confrontation Clause than the process currently available. As
noted above, permitting remote video testimony would be worth-
while even if it only sanctified the action by the Gigante court and
improved on Rule 15 for witnesses located within the United
States. However, the likelihood that remote video would facilitate
the presentation of testimony of otherwise problematic foreign
witnesses, in a climate where those witnesses will become increas-
ingly important in criminal cases, makes the argument for Rule
26(b) compelling.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
Even a great idea for improving the administration ofjustice still
has to pass constitutional muster, though. In this section I contend
that the Judicial Conference proposal to permit use of live two-way
video testimony in exceptional circumstances satisfies the Confron-
tation Clause. That is, Justices Breyer and O'Connor have it right,
22. Friedman, supra note 3, at 10 n.20. It is interesting to one steeped in our own tradi-
tion to note that to a significant part of the world, our practice of exposing witnesses to
questioning by the parties is considered barbaric, a conflict between traditions that even
decades of future globalization may not resolve.
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and when the Supreme Court ultimately considers the question in
the context of a criminal case it should hold the use of live two-way
video is constitutional in the limited circumstances for which it is
intended. The argument is divided into two parts. The first shows
how live two-way video testimony is consistent with existing Con-
frontation Clause precedents. The second takes a look at Justice
Scalia's statement opposing the proposed amendment. and con-
cludes that his reservations are unfounded.
As a preliminary matter, not all video testimony is equal as far as
the Confrontation Clause is concerned. The calculus is very differ-
ent depending on whether or not the defendant has the
opportunity to be present with the witness during the testimony.3
On its face Rule 26(b) does not specify whether or not the defen-
dant may be in the presence of the witness. It merely states that two
way video testimony is admissible if exceptional circumstances
make its use appropriate and if the witness is otherwise unavail-
able.
There appears to be no significant constitutional issue if the de-
fendant is given the chance to be present with the witness. 4 For the
purpose of this section, therefore, I will assume that the defendant
wants to be present but it is not feasible to secure her presence,
and discuss whether that can be permissible under the Confronta-
tion Clause and if so, when.
More than 100 years ago, in Mattox v. United States, the Supreme
Court summarized the goals of the Confrontation Clause:
The primary object of [the Clause] was to prevent depositions
or ex parte affidavits.., being used against the prisoner in lieu
of a personal examination and cross-examination of the wit-
ness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the wit-
ness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury
in order that they may look at him, and judge by his de-
meanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief. 
25
23. Friedman, supra note 3, at 12-13.
24. Id.
25. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). The Court held that the tes-
timony of a witness given at one trial, who was no longer available to testify at a retrial, was
properly admissible against the defendant over a Confrontation Clause objection.
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Less than twenty years ago the Court addressed the purpose of
the Clause again: "The main and essential purpose of confronta-
tion is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination."
2 6
As it concerns the proposal to authorize two-way video testimony
the most noteworthy aspect of the Court's early litany of Confron-
tation Clause objectives is that it did not include ensuring that the
defendant has the opportunity to be physically present while these
other purposes are accomplished. While Mattox, at least, was writ-
ten well before the invention of two-way video, it is nonetheless
significant that two-way video fulfills each of the purposes the
Court did identify - it provides for personal examination and cross-
examination in view of the jury so the jury can assess the witness's
demeanor and credibility.
More recently Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of the Court
in Coy v. Iowa, made a statement which, if applied to remote video
testimony, could be construed to mean that such testimony would
not be acceptable under the Confrontation Clause. He went so far
as to state: "' [T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant
a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of
fact.' "(emphasis added) 
2 7
On the surface Justice Scalia's statement would seem to leave lit-
tle room for witnesses to testify by remote video where that
testimony is outside the presence of the defendant. 28 However,
even at the time Justice Scalia wrote it, his assertion was accurate
only if the "guarantee" was interpreted so narrowly as to be trivial.
For example, he certainly could not have meant that the only ad-
missible testimony was that of witnesses who faced the defendant in
front of the jury. As the Coy concurrence 29 and dissente0 both noted,
the Clause cannot literally require such a confrontation in all cases
because that would be inconsistent with the admission of evidence
that falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, such as a state-
26. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis in origi-
nal). The question before the Court was whether the prosecutor's use of an expert witness
violated the Confrontation Clause, where the expert was no longer able to recall the basis
for his opinion. The Court held that the Clause was not violated.
27. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988). The issue in Coy was whether a state could
have a rule that routinely allowed child witnesses in sexual molestation cases to be screened
so as not to see the defendant against whom they were testifying. The Court held that this
blanket procedure violates the Confrontation Clause.
28. Even under justice Scalia's language, though, one could still argue that two-way
video testimony, in which the witness and defendant see each other clearly, is "face-to-face"
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. As will be seen, subsequent developments
have made that argument unnecessary.
29. 487 U.S. at 1024.
30. 487 U.S. at 1028.
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ment by a co-conspirator, dying declarations and statements against
the witness's interest.3' Although the defendant never has the op-
portunity for any face-to-face confrontation in these situations
(much less confrontation before the jury) the Court has nonethe-
less ruled the evidence admissible, reasoning that the Framers
never intended the Clause to preclude accepted hearsay from
criminal trials.3 ' Therefore, Justice Scalia's guarantee was only valid
if quite literally restricted to witnesses who testified in person in
court, which made it almost circular and largely insignificant.
Not long after Coy the Court made clear that whatever the merits
of Justice Scalia's guarantee when he first articulated it, it is no
longer even literally correct. Maryland v. Craig held that under
some circumstances the testimony of child witnesses could be re-
ceived while the child is screened so as not to see the defendant,
thereby establishing an exception to literal face-to-face confronta-
tion even for witnesses who do testify live.33 Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, noted that "[the Court has] never held...
that the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the
absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them
at trial."
3 4
The fact that defendants do not have an absolute right to con-
front the witnesses against them in person in court is only a start,
though. While the right may not be absolute it is certainly broad,
and the real problem is to identify its boundaries. For the reasons
next stated, use of two-way video to present the testimony of a wit-
ness who is not reasonably available to testify in person (the only
circumstance where Rule 26(b) would come into play) is within
those boundaries-it is supported by the same Confrontation
Clause principles on which the federal courts have relied for many
years to admit hearsay and other testimony despite the absence of
face-to face confrontation before the jury.
As noted above, the Supreme Court has long recognized that
the Confrontation Clause was never intended to preclude the ad-
31. See, for example, the discussion in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-850
(1990).
32. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
33. Craig, 497 U.S. 836. The Court held that where a trial court makes a finding, sup-
ported by evidence in the record, that the child witness may suffer so much distress that he
is likely to be unable to communicate if required to testify in the presence of the defendant,
the jury may receive the testimony even though the child testifies via one way, closed circuit
television, and therefore cannot see the defendant or the jury. Under the procedure ap-
proved by the Court, the witness remains subject to cross-examination by defense counsel,
who the witness can see, and the jury and defendant are both able to view the witness.
34. Id. at 844 (emphasis in original).
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mission of those forms of hearsay that were firmly entrenched at
the time of the Constitutional Convention. The reason is that this
firmly established hearsay possesses "indicia of reliability" that ade-
quately substitute for the guarantee of trustworthiness thought to
be provided by face-to-face confrontation, and therefore its admis-
sion is consistent with the Clause.35 By similar reasoning the Court
has also approved the admission of less firmly rooted hearsay so
long as it possesses comparable "particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness," such as the prior testimony of a witness who is
unavailable at trial, a hearsay exception that did not exist in 1787
but which is codified in Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (1).36
In reaching these results the Court has balanced the interests
the Clause protects with the need to ensure accurate truth seeking
by occasionally admitting evidence despite the absence of literal
confrontation. As the Court stated in Craig.
[Tjhe Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the
defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and ex-
pose [testimonial] infirmities [such as forgetfulness,
confusion, or evasion] through cross-examination, thereby
calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving
scant weight to the witness' testimony.
37
[O]ur precedents confirm that a defendant's right to con-
front accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical,
face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such
confrontation is necessary to further an important public pol-
icy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise
38
assured.
When faced with the choice between testimony which does not
fulfill Justice Scalia's "in-person" guarantee but fulfills most of the
purposes of the Confrontation Clause on the one hand, and no
testimony at all on the other, the federal courts have consistently
relied on the principles articulated in Ohio v. Roberts and Craig and
have held that public policy excuses the normal requirement for
35. 448 U.S. at 66.
36. Id.; see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
37. Craig, 497 U.S. at 847, quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985).
38. 497 U.S. at 850.
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live, in-person confrontation." That is, the courts routinely weigh
the objectives served by the Clause against the need for juries to
have all relevant evidence and invariably strike the balance in favor
of admitting the testimony so long as Confrontation Clause values
are otherwise protected. °
For example, courts have admitted the depositions of otherwise
unavailable witnesses even though (because the deposition was
taken in another country) the cross-examination was done by a
magistrate rather than by defense counsel (albeit based on ques-
tions submitted by the defense) ,4' and even though the defendant
(and in one case the defense attorney as well) was not physically
present during questioning.42 Indeed, federal courts of appeals
have found the values served by the Clause satisfied where an oth-
erwise unavailable witness "testified" only through admission of a
transcript from an earlier trial in which neither defendant nor de-
fense counsel even participated, and accordingly where the witness
was cross-examined only by counsel representing co-defendants, so
long as the defendant could not show how her personal participa-
tion would have made a material difference to the testimony.43 In
only one of these cases did the defendant have any opportunity to
confront the witness face-to-face, and that was not in front of the
jury.4 The alternative in each case was to lose the evidence entirely.
39. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1995), and cases discussed at footnote 42, in-
fra.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466 (6th Cir. 1991).
42. Each of the following cases affirmed a district court decision to permit the gov-
ernment to introduce the deposition of a foreign witness, over the objection of the
defendant, where the defendant was denied the opportunity to confront the witness(es)
face-to-face: United States v. McKeeve, 131 E3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. WBl/ker, 1 F.3d
423 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gifford, 892 F2d 263 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Kelly,
892 E2d 255 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988) (defense attor-
ney was also not present); and United States v. Sines, 761 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1985). It should
be noted, though, that both Wa/ker and Sines involved defendants who deliberately chose not
to attend the depositions, because they would have subjected themselves to the risk of arrest
by foreign authorities had they done so.
The typical procedure followed in such cases to protect the defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights to the extent feasible is for the defendant's attorney to attend the deposition in
person while the defendant participates via an open telephone line, with a second line avail-
able to permit her to consult with counsel in private.
43. United States v. Shaw, 69 F.3d 1249, 1251-54 (4th Cir. 1995) (testimony of two co-
conspirators, taken at trial of codefendant at which defendant not present because a
fugitive, admitted against defendant in his later trial); United States v. Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532,
1536-41 (11 th Cir. 1994) (testimony of codefendant, taken at trial of other codefendants, at
which defendant was not present because a fugitive, admitted against defendant in his later
trial).
44. Sturman, 951 F2d 1466.
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And, in each case that was a cost the court was unwilling to impose
on the accuracy of the fact-finding process where the defendant
retained the opportunity to have the witness's testimony tested by
cross-examination. In other words, in accord with the Supreme
Court's statements in Craig and other recent cases, it is always the
opportunity for cross-examination, not face-to-face confrontation,
which proves decisive to the Confrontation Clause analysis when
the alternative is to lose the testimony entirely.
These departures from the trial norm are all consistent with the
Supreme Court's recognition that while "face-to-face confrontation
forms 'the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation
Clause'... it is not the sine qua non of the confrontation right."
4
Rather, the Court has "attempted to harmonize the goal of the
Clause-placing limits on the kind of evidence that may be re-
ceived against a defendant-with a societal interest in accurate
fact-finding, which may require consideration of out-of-court
statements. ,
46
The point is not that face-to-face confrontation can or should be
dispensed with in criminal trials. Plainly it can not and should not,
at least as a matter of routine. Rather, the important point for pre-
sent purposes is that even as applied to cases in which the
defendant cannot be present when the witness testifies, Rule 26(b)
does not break significant new ground.
Indeed, the proposal to permit live two-way video in exceptional
circumstances is not only consistent with the current practice, it is
a small departure from the norm relative to several of the cases just
cited. That is, each of the cases discussed above dispensed with one
or more of the following elements of classical confrontation: per-
sonal cross-examination by counsel, presence or participation
(even virtual presence or participation) by defendant or defense
attorney, jury ability to view the witness and witness ability to view
the defendant. Live two-way video dispenses with none of them.
It is also important that Rule 26(b) is not leading a charge to in-
troduce remote video testimony. Technology and the common law
have already taken us there. Technology is forcing the way because
it is now economically feasible to present high quality live two-way
video in court. The common law is forcing the way because courts
have already considered and been receptive to arguments that ex-
45. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990).
46. Id. at 849.
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ceptional circumstances warrant the use of remote testimony in
criminal trials.47
For these reasons, it should be understood that the proposed
amendment would not open a floodgate or signal a new departure
from our trial norm. It would merely regulate and sanctify a prac-
tice which is consistent with our Sixth Amendment tradition and
which is already, to some extent, in place. s
What, then, of the Supreme Court's refusal to adopt the pro-
posed amendment? All we know of the Court's decision is what we
can glean from Justice Scalia's statement. As to Justice Scalia, at
least, we know he was concerned that the use of live two-way video
in place of in-person testimony would not satisfy the Confrontation
Clause. He expressed his concerns in a catchy turn of phrase-
"[v]irtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect virtual con-
stitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect real
ones.,
49
While the phrase has a certain ring to it, it turns out to lack sub-
stance. As I understand Justice Scalia's argument, stripped to the
essentials it is this:
The use of one-way video to admit child testimony approved
by Maryland v. Craig satisfied the Confrontation Clause only
because two factors were present-i) the video furthered the
important public policy of preventing trauma to the witness,
and 2) there was a case-specific finding that it was necessary to
follow the procedure. Rule 26(b) is not so limited, so is not
acceptable under Craig. It would allow video testimony when-
ever a Rule 15 deposition is used, and even when Rule 15 is
not available. However, Rule 26(b) is not a satisfactory substi-
tute for Rule 15 because 1) two-way video (apparently unlike
Rule 15 depositions) is subject to the standard for live testi-
mony articulated in Craig, which is more stringent with
respect to the defendant's presence than is the standard for
47. See, e.g., Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gi-
gante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Nippon Paper, 17 F.Supp.2d 38 (D. Mass.
1998).
48. Professor Friedman contends that Rule 26(b) would have "greatly change[d]" the
manner in which witnesses may testify in criminal trials. Friedman, supra note 3, at 1. Inas-
much as the rule would be limited in its application to some of the situations where a witness
is not available to testify in court and which are currently covered by Rule 15, and when
applicable would preserve all the rights currently available to defendants under Rule 15, the
change may not be so dramatic as appears.
49. Statement ofJustice Scalia at 2.
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out of court testimony, and 2) Rule 15 spells out a defendant's
right to be present but Rule 26(b) does not.5°
It is useful to examine the different parts of Justice Scalia's ar-
gument in isolation. We can start with his assumption about the
scope of the proposed amendment. Justice Scalia states that the
Rule authorizes the use of video transmission whenever the parties
cannot take a Rule 15 deposition, suggesting that the proposal has
almost unlimited scope. There is certainly nothing in the proposed
rule itself which suggests that. Justice Scalia rests this statement on
the Advisory Committee Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 26. Those
notes are an appendix to the dissent of Justice Breyer. I am unable
to find anything in the notes which even hints that live two-way
video was intended by the Judicial Conference to broaden the cir-
cumstances where a substitute for live trial testimony may already
be used under existing law. As noted at the beginning of this arti-
cle, it appears that Rule 26(b) would never be broader than Rule
15.51 So, to the extentJustice Scalia is concerned that the proposed
amendment would significantly enlarge the present practice, his
concern appears unfounded.
What about Justice Scalia's point that the proposed use of two-
way video is less acceptable than a Rule 15 deposition because Rule
15 spells out a defendant's right to be present, while Rule 26(b)
does not? As I discuss in Section 3, although the proposed
amendment does not explicitly state that the defendant is entitled to
be present at the location of the witness if possible, that right is al-
ready embodied in the Confrontation Clause itself. Nothing in
Rule 26(b) is inconsistent with a defendant asserting that right in a
particular case. The absence of explicit language does not raise a
constitutional concern so long as the rule is consistent with the
Constitution, as it is.
What, then, of the argument that Rule 26(b) is subject to a more
stringent constitutional standard than a Rule 15 deposition be-
cause, unlike Rule 15, it applies to "live" testimony? Justice Scalia
relies on White v. Illinois for the proposition that the Court applies
a different test to live testimony than to out-of-court statements.52
50. Summarized from Statement ofJustice Scalia at 1-3.
51. In fact, it would sometimes be less broad, inasmuch as it could only substitute for
Rule 15 if the witness is available at the time of trial.
52. Statement of Justice Scalia at 2; see White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358
(1992) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the admission in a criminal
trial of excited utterances and statements made in furtherance of seeking medical treat-
ment, even if the declarant does not testify at the trial).
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However, the cited portion of White only stands for the proposition
that before a prosecutor can dispense with in-person confrontation
for trial witnesses there must be a suitable showing that it is neces-
sary to do so, while there is no need to make a similar showing of
necessity before hearsay is admitted. That principle plainly does
not serve to draw a meaningful distinction between a Rule 15
deposition and live two-way video under Rule 26(b). A Rule 15
deposition is taken for the very purpose of obtaining testimony to
be introduced at a criminal trial. In this critical respect it is identi-
cal to two-way video and differs from the "firmly rooted hearsay" as
to which no showing of necessity need be made. There is thus no
reason to treat Rule 15 depositions any differently than live testi-
mony or live video in this respect. The fact is that one must indeed
show that a Rule 15 deposition is necessary as a pre-condition to
taking the deposition and admitting the testimony.
The comparison with Rule 15 is largely beside the point, though.
The real question is whether Rule 26(b) satisfies the Constitution,
whether or not it is the equivalent of Rule 15. As to that question,
Justice Scalia faulted the proposal because it did not require a case-
specific finding that meets the standard of Craig, and because it
contained no requirement that the use of two-way video further an
important public policy. Justice Scalia is simply wrong on both
counts.
Rule 26(b) only authorized two-way video as a substitute for live
testimony if the proponent established case-specific "exceptional"
circumstances and if the witness was unavailable to testify at trial.
The rule did not spell out the circumstances that would count as
"exceptional," but here a comparison with Rule 15 is useful. As
noted above, Rule 15 is also limited to "exceptional" circum-
stances, and in practice it has been used almost exclusively when
the witness is unavailable to testify at trial.53
Rule 26(b) plainly would require that the findings of witness un-
availability and exceptional circumstances be case specific. The
question raised by Justice Scalia's statement, then, is why a case-
specific finding of exceptional circumstances is not sufficient to
meet the Craig requirement that video testimony is only an accept-
able substitute for the in-court version if the video version furthers
an important public policy.
53. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e). It is for this reason that Professor Friedman and I agree
that any rule which authorizes two-way video should not condition its use on both excep-
tional circumstances and witness unavailability. See text accompanying note 64, infra.
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One possibility is that the Judicial Conference simply chose the
wrong language. If, instead of requiring a finding of "exceptional
circumstances" it had required a finding that two-way video "fur-
thers an important public policy" it might be that Justice Scalia
would have been satisfied. As a practical matter, though, it is hard
to imagine that an exceptional interest would not further an im-
portant public policy. This is especially true in the context of two-
way video, as for the reasons next stated the only circumstance that
is likely to count as "exceptional," the government's inability to
produce the witness in court, is exactly the circumstance that gives
rise to the "important public policy" that underlies Craig and other
Confrontation Clause precedents.
The important public policy articulated in Craig, and repeated
by Justice Scalia, which warranted use of one-way video was "pro-
tecting a child witness from trauma.''54 Not explicitly stated in the
Court's analysis, but clearly implicit in its decision, was an overrid-
ing goal - preserving the integrity of the trial by ensuring that
important and relevant evidence was made available to the jury.
That this is so is shown by the fact that the child in Craig would
have been fully protected from trauma simply by not testifying at
all, a result that would have had the added benefit of avoiding any
tension with the Confrontation Clause. However, denying the jury
this evidence would have corrupted its fact-finding process and
substantially impeded the State of Maryland's ability to enforce its
law against child abuse. The Court has long recognized that the
government's interest in accurate fact-finding and in enforcement
of its criminal laws is an important public policy. 5 Only if the Court
in Craig accepted as a premise that it was more important for the
child's evidence to come before the jury than for the defendant to
receive the full panoply of Confrontation Clause protection did it
become necessary for the Court to balance the Clause against the
need to protect the witness.
Viewed in that light Craig is completely consistent with the* now
long line of precedent discussed above, both from the Supreme
Court and the federal appellate courts, which have struck exactly
the same balance in other Confrontation Clause contexts. The
courts have uniformly recognized that presenting reliable evidence
54. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852-55 (1990); Statement ofJustice Scalia at 1.
55. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1990), where, in explaining circum-
stances when the Confrontation Clause might need to give way to some extent, the Court
stated "[s]ignificantly, every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effective law enforcement."
See also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (the Confrontation Clause must
be balanced against the societal interest in accurate factfinding).
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to a criminal jury is an important public policy interest. In each
case where the courts have been willing to tolerate a deviation
from the in-court norm it has been because the alternative was tolose he " 56
lose the testimony. Craig is best understood as the application of
that principle in the context of child sexual abuse cases.
Now consider Rule 26(b). I have already noted that one re-
quirement for its use is a case-specific finding that the witness is
unavailable. In other words, the alternative to using the two-way
video (or an admittedly inferior Rule 15 deposition) is to lose the
evidence completely." Once that finding is made the use of Rule
26(b) to make the evidence available cannot be distinguished from
Craig in any significant way.
Professor Friedman asserts that the situation of the traumatized
child that justified use of one-way video in Craig is "fundamentally
different" than that of an adult witness who is able to testify but
cannot come to court. 58 The difference, he writes, is that it is im-
possible for the child to be confronted by the defendant and still
testify, while the adult witness could be confronted by the defen-
dant, presumably by bringing the defendant to him. The
difference is not so fundamental as it appears, though. If, in fact,
the defendant can be brought to the witness, then, as I argue else-
where in this article, the Confrontation Clause demands that her
desire be accommodated and nothing in Rule 26(b) prevents do-
ing so. That is not a basis for finding Rule 26(b) unconstitutional.
The only interesting constitutional question arises when the de-
fendant cannot be brought to the witness. But in that case, the
fundamental difference between the child in Craig and the adult in
the hypothetical case disappears completely. In fact, it follows from
Professor Friedman's statement that when the defendant cannot be
brought to the witness, the use of two-way video to present the tes-
timony of the adult witness to the jury is at least as satisfactory
under the Confrontation Clause as was the one-way video approved
in Craig.59
56. Professor Friedman writes that he doubts that mere inability to procure testimony
is enough to be an important public policy. Friedman, Remote Testimony, supra note 3, at 12
n.24. He does not explain his doubt. For my part, I am not aware of any other satisfactory
justification for Craig, while the fact that this justification is consistent with Confrontation
Clause precedents makes it very satisfying.
57. Or, as discussed at text accompanying note 11, supra, to preserve the testimony
through some lesser alternative like a Rule 15 deposition.
58. Friedman, supra note 3, at 12.
59. It should actually be more acceptable, since with two-way video the witness is con-
fronted by the virtual defendant.
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But, Professor Friedman also objects to any reliance on Craig to
support the use of two-way video on the basis that Craig is of dubi-
ous legitimacy itself and should therefore not be "extended."'6 I
disagree for two reasons. First, if Craig is properly viewed as just
one application of a long-standing rule that almost complete com-
pliance with the Confrontation Clause will suffice if the alternative
is to lose relevant evidence, then applying that same general rule to
any other situation in which the witness is unavailable is not an "ex-
tension" at all. Indeed, to the extent two-way video better protects
Confrontation Clause interests than the one-way video found ac-
ceptable in Craig, it is closer to the constitutional core.
Second, I do not agree that Craig is of dubious legitimacy. The
general principle that supports Craig is consistent with the Court's
precedents holding that the Confrontation Clause is not absolute,
and which appear to stand for the proposition that deviating from
full compliance with the Clause is acceptable if the alternative is to
lose relevant evidence entirely and the deviation is minor.
To appreciate this position it is helpful to repeat what is not at
stake. The Confrontation Clause protects several values.6 ' Two-way
video does not implicate most of them. In particular, it does not
implicate the witness's oath to tell the truth, the defendant's ability
to cross-examine, the ability of the jury to observe the witness, the
ability of the witness to see the judge, jury or defendant, or the de-
fendant's ability to see the witness. It is not even clear that it
diminishes in the least whatever benefits accrue to the defendant
by having the witness testify in her presence, since we do not yet
know whether real in-person testimony and virtual in-person testi-
mony differ in this regard. In any event, if two-way video has any
impact on the values served by the Clause, the impact is at the
margin of just one of those values. That is, even if virtual presence
is not the same as real presence, it is much closer to real presence
than it is to no presence at all. The question, then comes down to
whether the balance should be struck in favor of literal compliance
with full confrontation at the expense of losing relevant evidence,
or in favor of almost full confrontation in order to preserve rele-
60. Friedman, supra note 3, at 11-12.
61. We should also not lose sight of the fact that we do not know what values the
Framers intended the Clause to protect. Long after the Constitutional Convention the Su-
preme Court began to identify various values that strict in-person in-court confrontation
could protect. Those became the values that the Clause is assumed to be intended to pro-
tect. It is not at all clear that, if given the choice of individual values the Court has since
identified, the Framers would find all to be equally necessary. By the same token, we should
not be locked into assuming that all are equally important to protecting the essence of con-
frontation.
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vant evidence. The courts have been correct to strike the balance
in favor of the latter. Rule 26(b) would not have altered by one iota
the balance which has already been struck. For these reasons any
constitutional concerns about the proposed use of two-way video
are unfounded.
III. THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROPOSAL AND PROFESSOR
FRIEDMAN'S ALTERNATIVE
For the reasons stated above, it is constitutionally acceptable and
desirable to permit remote video testimony in appropriate cases.
What, then, of the particular proposal rejected by the Supreme
Court?
The first prerequisite to introducing live video testimony under
the proposed amendment is that the proponent establishes "excep-
tional circumstances." 62  Professor Friedman believes this
requirement is swallowed by the third prerequisite, that the witness
be "unavailable" as defined by Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) .63 If
one assumes that the desired testimony is material, Professor
Friedman is probably correct. As he notes, any time the witness has
material testimony and is unavailable a court is likely to find the
circumstances "exceptional."
6 4
The resulting confusion may not be benign. Courts are obli-
gated to give effect to all parts of a rule if they can, so can be
expected to try to give separate meaning to "unavailable" and "ex-
ceptional circumstances." The result could well be that courts
looking for circumstances more exceptional than a witness who
cannot be produced for trial will unduly restrict Rule 26(b) in the
process. The best that can be hoped for, if the phrase is not simply
ignored, is that it will be construed to mean that testimony which is
otherwise unavailable must be material, as this is not elsewhere ex-
plicit in the proposed amendment. Rule 26 does not need a
materiality provision, however, as the Federal Rules of Evidence
already impose that requirement.
65
62. The Advisory Committee commentary notes that the "exceptional circumstances"
requirement is also found in Rule 15, which requires proof of such circumstances before a
deposition can be taken in a criminal case. Appendix at 8.
63. Friedman, supra note 3, at 14.
64. Id.
65. A trial court already has the power to exclude evidence that is not material under
Rules 401 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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Having strongly made his point that it adds nothing to require a
showing of both exceptional circumstances and unavailability, Pro-
fessor Friedman nonetheless keeps the requirement for
exceptional circumstances in his proposed substitute rule, and with
respect to prosecution witnesses he keeps the requirement of un-
availability as well.6" The rule would be better if it were only
conditioned on the witness's unavailability.
If "unavailability" is to remain in the rule, the next question is
how it should be defined. As noted above, the proposed amend-
ment incorporates the definition of unavailability in Fed. R. Evid.
804(a) (4)-(5). Professor Friedman cautions that because Rule 804
and Rule 26 have different purposes, this wholesale incorporation
might cause confusion or lead to bad results.
I agree that incorporating the Rule 804 definition in this way is
less than desirable, but not out of concern for bad results. It is
enough that it would be more aesthetically pleasing to have a rule
that did not lead to the theoretical possibility that a corpse could
give live video testimony, as is permitted under a literal reading of
the current language. But, aesthetics aside, it is not clear that in-
corporating the Rule 804 definitions in Rule 26 presents any
substantive problem.
As I understand the motive for Professor Friedman's proposed
definition, it is a reaction to the Judicial Conference's proposal to
incorporate the Rule 804 definition, including its provision defin-
ing a witness as unavailable because of mental infirmity. Professor
Friedman's concern is that this language might permit a prosecu-
tor to argue for admission of remote video testimony of a witness
whose only "infirmity" is that he is uncomfortable testifying in per-
son at court.67 To prevent this perceived potential abuse, Professor
Friedman would include a clause requiring any purported mental
infirmity to be assessed without respect to the presence of other
persons in the courtroom."
66. Friedman, supra note 3, at 21-22 (referring to sections b(1) and b(3)(B) of pro-
posed revision to Rule 26(b)).
67. Friedman, supra note 3, at 16. Professor Friedman also notes that incorporating
the Rule 804(a)(5) definition of unavailability will incorporate its parenthetical clause as
well. Id. at 17. But that clause is, by its own terms, inapplicable, coming into play only where
a statement is sought to be admitted because it was made under belief of impending death,
or was against the declarant's interest, or concerns the declarant's personal or family history.
As with the case of the witness who cannot attend because of death the courts should be
capable of ignoring this patently inapplicable provision without difficulty. Again, only the
aesthetic aspect is really troubling.
68. Friedman, supra note 3, at 22 (referring to section b(3) (B) (i) of suggested redraft
of the proposed amendment).
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Professor Friedman's concern seems unfounded. One reason is
that were the prosecutor able successfully to rely on Rule 26 to
make the argument Professor Friedman fears, his success would do
nothing to get him past any Confrontation Clause problems. 69 So,
even if Professor Friedman is correct that the argument is specious,
there is no need to draft Rule 26 to prevent it.
More fundamentally, one would hope that before any prosecu-
tor would advance such an argument and any court accept it, there
would be substantial evidence that this previously unheard of men-
tal infirmity really existed, independent of the witness's reluctance
to confront a particular defendant. In the absence of such evi-
dence the argument would plainly be for the purpose of shielding
a witness who is simply reluctant to face the defendant, and would
be frivolous. Courts will undoubtedly reject it and should be
trusted to do so, without any explicit provision in the rule.
My concern, and the reason this is worth the trouble to discuss,
is that drafting rules to anticipate and neutralize all potential frivo-
lous applications may cause other unintended mischief. The effect
of anticipating too many problems might be to squelch a position
that either was not anticipated at the time of drafting or seems im-
plausible in the abstract but turns out to have merit when it really
arises. For example, if it turned out that evidence of a mental in-
firmity which is triggered by testifying in court really did exist in a
particular case (maybe an adult variant of Craig), perhaps the ar-
gument in favor of using remote testimony would be stronger than
now appears. The possibility should not be precluded by the rule
before it can be raised in an actual case. For these reasons I think
that if a definition of unavailability is included in Rule 26, it should
not preclude any particular mental infirmity.
Another change Professor Friedman would make is to require
that the jury be able to see not only the witness but also anyone
present with the witness, to prevent hidden coaching. This is
worthwhile. Although one would hope that courts would protect
against the possibility of coaching on their own initiative, there is
no sense leaving open the possibility that some court will fail to do
so. I also agree with Professor Friedman's suggestion that the rule
should articulate in a general way the required clarity of transmis-
69. Indeed, Maryland v. Craig itself might make it hard to prevail with such an argu-
ment. The Court defined its holding as approving the denial of face-to-face confrontation
only where the physical presence of the defendant (not the courtroom setting generally)
would make it impossible for the witness to communicate, and cited with apparent approval
that part of the Maryland court of appeals opinion which stated that the witness's inability to
testify in an ordinary courtroom setting would not be sufficient. 497 U.S. at 857-58.
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sion, and that the proposed amendment is correct to require two-
way video transmission.
Professor Friedman would make another very substantive
change to the amended Rule 26, one with which I strongly dis-
agree. He would treat the defense much more favorably than the
prosecution in three ways:70 1) the prerequisite that the witness be
unavailable before video testimony is permitted would only apply
to prosecution witnesses; 2) only prosecution witnesses would be
required to testify via two-way (rather than one-way) video; and 3)
the defense (but only the defense) would have spelled out in the
rule the right to be present at the witness's location.7'
At first blush one might reasonably think this is an issue that re-
quires no discussion at all, because the rules ought to be the same
for both prosecution and defense as a matter of simple fairness.
While that is certainly true when the prosecution and defense are
similarly situated, Professor Friedman is correct that in some in-
stances they are not.72 When they are not, some asymmetry in the
treatment of the government and defense is necessary to the fair
and efficient administration ofjustice.
It follows, as Professor Friedman also notes, that asymmetric
treatment of the prosecution and defense is neither wholly good
nor wholly bad.73 Rather, each asymmetry must be considered on its
own merits, in light of the policies it implicates. On this basis the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Federal Rules of Evi-
dence contain several justifiable asymmetries.74
One of the oft-cited bases for asymmetries that favor the defense
is that our criminal justice system would rather free ten guilty per-
sons than convict one innocent. If that were the only principle at
70. Friedman, supra note 3, at 21-22 (referring to the suggested redraft at section
b(3)).
71. In making this argument Professor Friedman notes that asymmetries in the crimi-
nal law are not inherently undesirable. Friedman, supra note 3, at 20 n.39 and
accompanying text. That is certainly true, as is the point that each potential asymmetry
should be judged with respect to the interests it serves, not simply with respect to whether it
creates an imbalance between prosecution and defense. Id. However, it is equally true that
the fact that some existing asymmetries may be acceptable does not demonstrate that a par-
ticular new asymmetry is also desirable.
72. Friedman, supra note 3, at 20.
73. Id. at 20 n.39.
74. For example, Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, gives defendants
(but only defendants) the right to request a change of venue, while Rule 29 authorizes only
the defendant to move for a "directed verdict" (actually a judgment of acquittal). Similarly,
Rule 104(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, protects only a criminal defendant from wide
ranging cross examination when she testifies as to a preliminary matter, and Rule 404(a)(1)
excludes pertinent character traits only of the accused from evidence, unless she first offers
evidence concerning such a trait.
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work, it would justify skewing every rule in favor of the defense. But
it is not - there are many other policies that underlie the criminal
justice system, not the least of which is to ensure the accuracy of
the trial process. For the reasons that follow I believe that in light
of the several principles at work, none of the asymmetries sug-
gested by Professor Friedman for Rule 26(b) isjustified.
Let's consider first the right of the opposite party to be physi-
cally present when the witness testifies. Noting that the concept of
"confrontation" may lose something if the witness is not in the im-
mediate presence of the defendant, Professor Friedman appears to
prefer that Rule 26 confer on the defendant an unqualified right
to be present at the witness's location, but he would have the rule
be silent as to the prosecutor's right to attend."' This asymmetry
raises several questions-should either party have an absolute right
to attend? Should the parties have differing rights to attend? And,
whatever the parties' rights ought to be, is Rule 26 the appropriate
vehicle through which to address them?
What about an absolute right in either party to attend? As noted
in Section 2, above, the Confrontation Clause does not give defen-
dants that right. Professor Friedman's proposal would therefore
expand the defendant's right beyond its current boundaries.
That would be counter-productive.6 It would, for example, have
precluded the testimony of the ill witness in Gigante-Gigante was
apparently too ill himself to be present with the witness, and a
court would not and should not find that Gigante's unintentional
illness acted as a waiver of any right he had to attend.
The greater mischief, though, would be with respect to foreign
witnesses. If, for instance, the defendant is in custody, the foreign
country in which the witness is present may be unwilling to guaran-
75. Friedman, supra note 3, at 21-22 (referring to suggested redraft at section
(b)(3)(C)).
76. Although it would be counterproductive in a perfect world, as things now stand
the world is not perfect. The Supreme Court has rejected the Judicial Conference proposal,
apparently based on a belief, which I have argued is unfounded, that two-way video testi-
mony is not constitutional unless the witness is in the physical presence of the defendant.
There is presumably no constitutional barrier to the use of remote video testimony when the
defendant does have the right to be present. A rule that only allowed video testimony of
witnesses in the presence of defendants would still be useful for all the other advantages it
would confer over present practice. At a minimum, therefore, the rule should propose that
much, although it would be far from ideal.
77. Waivers of constitutional rights must be both knowing and intentional. See, e.g.,
United States v. Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938) ("A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege"). Although Gigante's waiver of the right to be present may have been
knowing, it could hardly be characterized as intentional, forced as it was by his own illness.
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tee her security and may accordingly forbid her the passage neces-
sary to her in-person participation.7" Professor Friedman's more
restrictive proposal would forbid the use of live video to introduce
this testimony.79
At the same time, conditioning the application of Rule 26(b) on
the defendant's absolute right to attend would have no impact on
other, already accepted, methods of obtaining the same testimony.
A prosecutor could obtain a stenographic record or a videotape,
even absent the defendant, in appropriate cases.0 Live remote tes-
timony is a closer approximation to having the witness in court
during trial than either a stenographic or video record. It would
make no sense to make live remote testimony unavailable where
lesser options are available. If Rule 26(b) is to mention the right of
either party to be present at the witness's location at all, Professor
Friedman's more flexible proposal, to permit the opposite party to
be present unless there is a compelling reason not to, is the more
appropriate.
But, should Rule 26 spell out the right of either party to be pre-
sent? A defendant already has a qualified right to attend in person
based on the Confrontation Clause itself. A strong argument can
be made that so long as it is reasonably possible for the defendant
to be physically present with the witness, the Clause guarantees her
that right. The cases discussed above which authorized the admis-
sion of out-of-court testimony though the defendant was not
present did so only because there was no reasonable way to obtain
78. See, e.g., United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1997); United States v. Gif-
ford, 892 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1989).
79. Professor Friedman states that a rule which allows remote testimony whenever a
foreign government resists face-to-face confrontation gives American authorities an incen-
tive to treat foreign objections as dispositive rather than to try to negotiate around them.
Friedman, supra note 3, at 11 n.22. This is wrong for at least two reasons. First, it is not as if
prosecutors see it as being to their advantage to be required to follow foreign procedures.
Like defense counsel, we prefer to examine witnesses ourselves and to otherwise follow the
procedures with which we are familiar, and in many cases any foreign procedure that re-
stricts the rights of a defendant will restrict the prosecutor's rights as well. Indeed, it has
been for just that reason that my colleagues and I have routinely negotiated with foreign
governments to get their approval of our use of American-style courtroom procedures each
time we have had the need to obtain testimony overseas. Second, few prosecutors are anx-
ious to litigate an unnecessary Confrontation Clause issue. If we can procure the defendant's
presence, it is in our interest to do so. In any event, even if one demonstrated that prosecu-
tors do need an additional incentive to try to pressure foreign governments to permit us to
obtain testimony under American procedures, it is not clear how workable standards, which
would do more good than harm, could be created. In this regard it is helpful to note that,
like it or not, we are often at the mercy of foreign governments when we ask their help, and
often have little if any bargaining power.
80. Id.
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the testimony with the defendant present."' Each wrestled with the
Confrontation Clause implications of the decision, and there is no
reason to think any would have ruled as it did had it been possible
to procure the defendant's in-person presence. Nothing in the
proposed amendment to Rule 26 would foreclose such an argu-
ment by a defendant.
Although spelling out in the rule the parties' right to be present
should not be necessary, it might be useful to avoid confusion. In
this regard, it is interesting that although Rule 26(b) was itself si-
lent as to the defendant's presence at the location of the witness,
Justice Scalia seems to have assumed that the defendant would not
be present. An explicit provision that did not go beyond the
scope of the Confrontation Clause would avoid any suggestion that
Rule 26(b)'s silence on that point means that no such right exists.
If Rule 26 does articulate a right to be present, should it apply
only to defendants? Clearly not. While Professor Friedman is obvi-
ously correct that there is no Confrontation Clause to protect the
prosecution's right to be present, it does not follow that the Rules
of Criminal Procedure should perpetuate this asymmetry at trial.
At least a part of the rationale behind our current interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause is a belief that a party's presence might
have some impact on the testimony of witnesses called by the op-
posing side. If that assumption is correct, surely its impact should
be recognized when it is the prosecutor's presence that counts as
well as when it is the defendant's. That is, until there is some quali-
tative support for the notion that the party's live presence does not
appreciably enhance the accuracy of testimony, the Constitution's
83silence on this point is no reason to disadvantage the prosecution.
This follows from two of the goals our criminal justice system at-
tempts to achieve-accurate trials and fair treatment for both
sides. In the absence of some overriding consideration, and none is
present in the case of remote video testimony, these goals ought to
carry the day.
The potential danger, where the defendant's right is clearly
identified in the rule and the prosecution's is not, is that a court
might reasonably conclude that the omission means the prosecu-
tion has no such right. Therefore, if Rule 26 addresses the right of
either party to be present, it should do so for both parties.
81. See cases discussed at note 42, supra.
82. Statement ofJustice Scalia at 2.
83. As Professor Friedman acknowledges, he has no such support. Friedman, supra
note 3, at 8-9.
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One last word on this issue. As noted above, there are excep-
tional circumstances where federal courts have found it acceptable
for a prosecution witness to testify although the defendant did not
have the opportunity to be present.8 4 If exceptional circumstances
in some case make the prosecutor similarly unavailable, fairness
dictates that the defendant still be able to introduce the testimony.
Next, should the requirement that the video transmission be
two-way apply only to prosecution witnesses? Professor Friedman
contends (and I agree) that two-way video transmission should be
required for prosecution witnesses. As he notes, a prosecution wit-
ness may find it harder to lie if he has to look at the defendant
while he testifies.85 As he further notes, given modern technology
two-way video should not present a logistical hurdle: "If one-way
transmission is practicable, then almost by hypothesis two-way
transmission is as well, and it ought to be required.".
Despite these sentiments, he suggests that one-way video should
suffice if it is the testimony of defense witnesses that is offered. 87 I
disagree. Just as a prosecution witness might find it harder to lie
while looking at the defendant, a defense witness might find it
harder to lie while looking at judge, jury or prosecutor. There is no
sound policy reason to free defense witnesses of this potential aid
to their truthfulness.
Finally, the third asymmetry-should the defendant be free to
introduce testimony by remote video whenever she wants? Profes-
sor Friedman's proposed Rule 26(b) would require the court to
decide whether it is in the interests of justice for the prosecution to
introduce remote testimony of its witnesses, but he would leave it
up to the defense alone to decide when to introduce remote testi-
mony of defense witnesses. 8 He justifies this asymmetry by
asserting that remote testimony by defense witnesses is likely to be
less effective than in-person testimony.8 9 This rationale lacks force
for two reasons. There is no support for the statement that remote
video testimony will be less effective than the in-person kind. Also,
as Professor Friedman notes when discussing his concern about the
prosecution's use of remote testimony, there may be something
84. See, e.g., the cases cited at note 42, supra.
85. Friedman, supra note 3, at 18.
86. Id. at 19.
87. Id. at 21.
88. "Ordinarily, then, if the accused finds video transmission his most satisfactory al-
ternative--given the importance of the witness's testimony and whatever costs and
difficulties there may be in presenting the witness in the courtroom-the court should not
second-guess the judgment." Friedman, supra note 3, at 21.
89. Id.
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intangible about testifying in court that has a salutary impact on
the witness.90
As with the other asymmetries discussed above, there is no policy
reason to give defendants the benefit of these doubts. If Professor
Friedman's assumptions are correct, permitting the defense freer
use of remote testimony would only decrease the accuracy of the
trial process without conferring any legitimate benefit on defen-
dants. So long as the justification for not permitting the
prosecution unfettered use of remote video testimony is that it
might not be as good as the real thing, there is no sound reason to
give the defense unilateral power to decide when to use it. If there
are good reasons for defense witnesses to testify remotely, courts
can be trusted to recognize them after receiving appropriate input
from counsel for both sides.9'
IV. THE FUTURE
The proposed amendment, especially as modified by some of
Professor Friedman's suggestions, is a worthwhile start to regulat-
ing the use of video technology in the criminal courtroom. But it is
only a start. The possibility of live remote testimony raises, for the
first time, the question whether the interests that are thought to be
served by having the witness testify in the physical presence of the
defendant can be satisfied by any other means even when the wit-
ness can be produced in court.
Quite rightly, in the absence of evidence to the contrary Justice
Scalia and Professor Friedman counsel us to be very cautious be-
fore watering down the requirement that the defendant physically
be present with the witness. But, while there is intuitive appeal to
the notion that the defendant's physical presence with the witness
is a more useful inhibitor of false testimony than is her remote
presence, it is by no means certain that our intuition is correct.92 It
is at least plausible that the opposite is true, that is, that the values
protected by the Confrontation Clause are protected equally by
90. Id. at 8.
91. It's not clear what those good reasons would be. Defendants certainly do not need
freer access to remote testimony to enable them to produce witnesses, as they can already
call upon the power of the court in most instances to compel their attendance, and defen-
dants have the court pay the cost of their attendance as well if they are unable to do so.
92. Professor Friedman asserts that remote testimony is "very much a second best pro-
cedure." Friedman, supra note 3, at 7. His assertion may or may not be true-to my
knowledge it has never been tested.
[VOL. 35:4
Remote Testimony-A Prosecutor's Perspective
physical and by virtual confrontation. It is also at least plausible
that the Clause is fully served merely by subjecting the witness to
cross-examination, even if the defendant is neither really nor virtu-
ally present. And, it is at least plausible that the physical presence
of the defendant makes absolutely no difference when some types
of witness testify (e.g. records custodians), but makes a large dif-
ference when other types testify (e.g. a cooperating codefendant).
These questions are worth asking. One of the significant mone-
tary costs of the criminal justice system is that of transporting
witnesses from various parts of the country to the location of trial.
Many of those witnesses testify only about uncontested matters. Al-
though not contested, their testimony is nonetheless important to
establish elements of the offense, or to explain parts of the transac-
tion that gave rise to the charge.
As noted above we are likely to see substantially increased reli-
ance on foreign witnesses to make these points in federal criminal
cases. The expense of procuring testimony from foreign witnesses
is dramatically higher than that of domestic witnesses. The gov-
ernment must pay to transport not only the prosecutor and
investigating agent, but also the defendant(s), defense attorney(s),
and, if not locally available, a court reporter and videographer, to
the location of the witness. In a given case that can easily be tens or
hundreds of thousands of dollars to obtain evidence that, while it
93may be critical, may also be completely uncontested.
If this expense actually furthers a substantial right of a defen-
dant, there is no question that the judicial system should bear it.94
But, given the costs, we should not simply assume that it does. 95 As
93. The paradigmatic witness (whether foreign or domestic) in a white collar federal
criminal case is a business person called on to testify about transactions that took place in
what appeared to be the ordinary course of business. The normal contest in such a case is
whether the defendant had fraudulent intent, which rarely rests on witness credibility.
94. It may be worth noting the limits of what I see as the ability to use the amended
rule to obtain foreign testimony. The overriding consideration is that remote testimony be
used only when it is in the interests of justice to do so. While it seems to me that the
amendment could greatly simplify the acquisition of non-controversial foreign evidence, I
doubt a court would find it in the interests ofjustice to permit remote testimony that is con-
troversial absent a substantially stronger showing of exceptional circumstances by the
prosecutor.
95. It is the government that currently pays to transport witnesses to court, and the
government that pays to transport defendants, defense attorneys, etc., to witnesses when a
deposition is to be taken. It would be the government that pays to transport defendants to
be with witnesses under Rule 26(b). Both the government and the taxpayers that support it
have a lot of other things on which to spend their money. Those of us who spend taxpayers'
money on criminal justice should do so as efficiently as is consistent with doing our jobs
effectively and preserving the rights of defendants, and the rules ought to be designed to
foster as much to the extent consistent with the Constitution and principles of fairness.
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judges continue to grapple with the potential of new technologies,
it will be important to the proper exercise of their discretion that
they be able to make informed decisions about the impact of those
technologies on the parties' right to a fair trial. To my knowledge,
no effort has been made to address this issue, and there is substan-
tial potential for worthwhile contributions.
